policy is not as sympathetic as the DEA would like it to be, they conclude *that* the "Jewish Lobby" is to blame.

Moreover, the DEA is not the final decision-maker and may not fully understand the factors that *eventually* determine the policy outcome. While a more satisfying answer is hard to reach, an oddity in the poll, namely that the *Prime Minister and the cabinet rank second-and-fifth respectively in their influence on Canada's Middle-East policy*, might somewhat discredit the whole survey. In an executive driven parliamentary system, it is curious that anyone, particularly *bureaucrats* who are well *versed in*

- 1 In Canada, the Jewish community is recognized both by itself and the community at large as a distinct ethnic and religious group (Taras and Weinfeld 1990:665). While this paper could use the terms "religioethnic," "ethnoreligious," or other words to describe the Jewish community in Canada, it will rely on "ethnic," which is the term most commonly preferred in the literature. Additionally, the use of this term allows for greater inclusiveness in the context of Middle-East foreign policy because the Arab community can be considered as one ethnic group, but not one religious group. However, problems with the term, "ethnic group," present themselves when dealing with the American Jewish community, who are generally more assimilated than their Canadian counterparts thereby somewhat losing their distinct ethnic identity while retaining religious differentiation (Taras and Weinfeld 1990).
- 2 Canada's Jewish community is better organized and takes politics more seriously than other ethnic groups (Riddell-Dixon 1985:46; Taras and Weinfeld 1990:670). The primary organizations in its lobby are the Canadian Jewish Congress, the Canadian Zionist Federation and the fraternal organization B'nai Brith Canada. In 1967, as a response to the perceived unpreparedness of Canada's Jewish community to lobby for *Israel*, these groups created the Canada-Israel Committee (CIC), which remains the foremost pro-Israel lobby in Canada until today. However, various Jewish lobbies have presented themselves over the years. The United Zionist Council was founded in 1941, transformed into the Zionist Organization of Canada, and eventually reconstituted as the Canadian Zionist Federation in 1967 (Taras 1989:44-50). Canada's Jewish lobbies have taken a strategy of behind the scenes lobbying, favouring quiet diplomacy over publicity seeking. The CIC does not openly threaten MPs regarding the effect of their actions on Jewish voting as the Jewish lobby was apt to do prior to this; rather, MPs "are led" to draw their own conclusions. While only six seats have over ten percent Jewish voters, Canada's Jewish community votes in numbers exceeding the national average. While it is likely that few Canadian Jews swing their votes based on Middle-East issues, the "Jewish vote" remains on the mind of political strategists, leaders, and candidates (Taras 1989:52; Lyon 1992-1993:8-15).
- 3 Canada's Middle-East foreign policy from 1945 to the present has grappled with issues that are not mentioned in this paper. Most notably this includes peacekeeping in Cyprus, both Gulf Wars, and the war in Afghanistan. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine these issues. Moreover, this paper focuses only on those issues having a direct impact on Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Certainly, the landing of Iraqi Scud Missiles in Tel-Aviv during the first Gulf War had a direct impact on Israel; however, Canada's reasons for involvement in the war were far removed from anything to do with Israel or the "Jewish Lobby" (Ismael 1994; Sucharov 2003).
- 4 "The *secondary boycott* is an attempt by *Arab states*, firms and individuals to pressure firms of other countries (namely

government procedures, could conceive of the Prime Minister and the cabinet as not holding the top two decision-making positions.

I reiterate: While Jewish, Arab, and other foreign-interest groups all lobby, Canada's national interest loses out. Meanwhile, as foreign interests plunder our **Canadian**

Canada's Middle-East foreign policy has generally reflected the government of Canada's own interests, rather than the *sectarian goals of ethnic interest groups*, particularly those of Jewish-Canadian communities. Canada's early leftist policies attempted to reinforce the relationships amongst the great Western powers, while its later policies reflected a will toward economic gains, largely through bilateral relationships.

Footnotes

- Canada) to refrain from dealing with *Israel* or to end certain relationships with Israel, as a condition of trade with *Arab states*, firms, or individuals. This in effect compels a Canadian boycott of a country with whom Canada has friendly relations and against whom Canada has not itself authorized a boycott" (Stanislawski 1977:1).
- 5 "The tertiary boycott is an attempt to prevent firms or other countries (namely Canada) from dealing with firms of their own or other non-involved countries because of the latter firm's relationship with Israel, as a condition of doing business with Arab states, firms, or individuals" (Stanislawski 1977:1).
- 6. Interestingly, Canada's need to support the U.N. while helping to maintain healthy relations among states overshadowed three domestic and one foreign concerns that would tend to favour an anti-partition stance. Domestically, Elizabeth MacCallum, the Department of External Affairs Middle-East expert, was unabashedly pro-Arab, the Canadian public was increasingly anti-Israel due to terrorist attacks perpetrated in Palestine by Jews and a quiet anti-Semitic attitude existed among many Canadians. With respect to the foreign concern, the British government had an interest in maintaining good relations with the Arab states (Bercusson 1984:12; Kay 1978:123).
- 7. The "Jewish Lobby" at this time consisted of the Zionist Organization of Canada, the Canadian Jewish Congress and the Canada Palestine Committee. This last group was comprised entirely of non-Jewish Zionists (Taras 1989).
- 8. The Jewish Agency was established by the World Zionist Organization following World War One to represent the Jewish community in Palestine to the British. The Haganah was its military wing (Jewish Agency-American Section 1964).
- 9 Other Canadian domestic groups not dedicated to Jewish/Zionist issues also favoured partition. Primarily these groups were the UN Association and organized labour (Kay 1978:124).
- 10 Canada's businesses did not begin their involvement in Middle-East affairs until the anti-boycott legislation debate. While their economic interests certainly fell under the "national interest" heading, they did not make the connection between the recognition of a non-state actor and major business contracts (Goldberg 1989:108-110).
- Many of these groups came together to form CAPLOT, or Canadians Against PLO terrorism. Among those organizations that publicly opposed having PLO delegates at the Crime Conference were the Law Society of Upper Canada, provincial and federal Liberal caucuses, Premier of Ontario, Chairman of Metro Toronto, International Association of Police Chiefs, Toronto Police Commission, Canadian Airline Pilots' Association, Hotelier's Association, and all federal and provincial opposition parties (Miller 1991:28; Stein 1976-1977:285). There was also a generally high anti-PLO sentiment in Canada at that time. Following PLO leader Yassir Arafat's appearance before the UNGA in November 1974, the Canadian media

I reiterate: While Jewish, Arab, and other foreigninterest groups all lobby, Canada's national interest loses out. Meanwhile, as foreign interests plunder our *Canadian identity piecemeal...* Canada's national interest (viz. all us freeborn "pure-blooded and true-hearted" Canadian men and women - i.e. the traditional Canadian family) loses out by the generations.

Mark well ye this: Make no reservations about it but we goi shall have no treaty with the cycloptic ZOG et.al..

- was overwhelmingly negative in its coverage of his organization (Ismael 1994:29).
- 12 "Jewish Lobby" responsible for having the government postpone the conference, thereby effectively denying the PLO admission into Canada. However, several other vocal groups opposed the PLO's presence in Canada, arguing that Canada's laws and opposition to terrorism prohibited the entrance of PLO members (Stein 1976-1977:285). Additionally important is that Canada had not yet recognized the PLO as the legitimate voice of the Palestinian people (Ismael 1994:52).

It follows, then, that Canada would have no reason to want PLO representatives at the conference. Furthermore, analysts argued that Canada's failure to recognize the PLO would not impede improved relations with the Arab world (Stein 1976-1977:282).

Notwithstanding the last few points, in the case of the U.N. Crime Conference, it can be reasonably argued that the "Jewish Lobby" had some effect. However, whatever power the "Jewish Lobby" had did not last for long. Despite their prolonged efforts to have Canada enact antiboycott legislation, the CIC completely failed. The Arab-Canadian community was fairly silent on the issue, but very satisfied with the government's inaction. Furthermore, the Canadian business community, a new player in foreign policy lobbying, had fought hard and won against antiboycott legislation that could negatively impact the newly discovered "Arab market." ¹³ The

- 12 However, its effect was not strong enough to bar PLO representatives from the U.N. Habitat Conference held in Vancouver eight months after the Crime Conference was scheduled to take place in Toronto (Goldberg 1989:108-109).
- 13 The following corporation and business associations were concerned about Arab threats of economic retaliation: Bell Canada, the Canadian Manufacturer's Association, the Canadian Export Association, the 13 DEA's interpretation mirrored that of the business community (Goldberg 1989:110-112; Stanislawski 1989:69). Under the rubric of Trudeauvian foreign policy doctrine, Canadian industries could legitimately claim that their economic welfare was beneficial to the national interest (Stanislawski 1989:63-64).
- 14 A source within the *Department of Industry, Trade, and Commerce* claimed that moving the embassy would cost Canada \$1 billion in business and 55 700 jobs (Flicker 2002-2003:133).
- 15 One of the reasons for the differing opinions on the **Lebanon War** between the Jewish community and the DEA was that while the Jewish community viewed it as a conflict between Israel and a terrorist state, the DEA tended to understand it as a conflict between two equal peoples (Miller 1991:62).
- 16 Presumably, one could argue that the map is from before 1921, when the first partition of Palestine into trans-Jordan and cis-Jordan took place. However, the book was published in 1994 and deals with a time period beginning in 1945.

A Passing Comment on the Question of Canadian MPs with dual citizenships

How far can a *foreign-born person* go in Canadian politics? *At least* 41 of 308 MPs sitting in the **House of Commons** of Conservative PM S. Harper's **39**th **Parliament of Canada** (2006-08) were not *even* born Canadian...but were born in *some* 28 countries other than Canada, including *Uganda*, *Malta*, *China*, *and elsewhere*. Note: 691,300 people holding *dual or triple citizenships* were living in Canada, *according to the 2001 census*. Harper's Conservatives were the governing party from 2006 to 2015.

"Canada went from 2.5 million protected lakes and rivers, down to just 159 under the Conservatives."


So the answer to the question as to *how far a foreigner can go in Canadian politick* is "right to the top." They could become Prime Minister. In fact, many of Canada's Prime Ministers were not born in Canada. At **Confederation**, the men who sat in the **House of Commons** came *mostly* from Ireland, England and Scotland, with a few from the United States

and France: (John A. Macdonald, Alexander Mackenzie, Mackenzie Bowell, and John Turner were all born in the UK).

We haven't yet had *a visible minority* or indigenous Prime Minister, or one born outside Canada or Britain: (British Columbia Premier Ujjal Dosanjh was born in India). More-so, a majority of Vancouver MPs have been foreign born for some time now. The concept of "a visible minority" is a *weaponized term* of *socio-politick double-speak*: The truth is White/Anglo/European people make up less than 5% of the world's population, making them *the real 'minorities' on our planet*.

Currently, there are *at least* 56 sitting parliamentarians — 44 MPs and 12 senators — born in countries outside Canada, including Afghanistan, Lebanon, Portugal, Poland, Pakistan, Syria, the United States and the United Kingdom, *according to information from the Library of Parliament and websites*. That figure does not include MPs and senators who hold citizenship through descent, naturalization or marriage.





By the **Constitution Act, 1867**, "the executive government of and over Canada is declared to continue and be vested in the Queen." She acts, ordinarily through the **Governor General**, whom she appoints, on the advice of the Canadian prime minister. The Governor General normally holds office for five years, though the tenure may be extended for a year or so.

Parliament consists of the Queen, the Senate and the House of Commons.

The Queen

The Queen performs many ceremonial duties when visiting Canada.

The Queen is the formal head of the Canadian state. She is represented federally by the Governor General, and provincially by the lieutenant-governors. Federal Acts begin: "Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and the House of Commons, enacts as follows..."; Acts in most provinces begin with similar words. Parliament (or the provincial legislature) meets only at the royal summons; no House of Parliament (or legislature) is equipped with a self-starter. No federal or provincial bill becomes law without Royal Assent. The monarch has, on occasion, given the assent personally to federal acts, but the assent is usually given by the Governor General or a deputy, and to provincial acts by the lieutenant-governor or an administrator.

The Governor General and the lieutenant-governors have the *right to be consulted by their ministers*, and the *right to encourage or warn them*. But they *almost grounds w* invariably must act on their ministers' advice, though there may be very rare occasions when they must, or may, act Parliament.

without advice or even against the advice of the ministers in office.

The Senate

The Senate usually has 105 members: 24 from the Maritime provinces (10 from Nova Scotia, 10 from New Brunswick, four from Prince Edward Island); 24 from Québec; 24 from Ontario; 24 from the Western provinces (six each from Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia); six from Newfoundland and Labrador; and one each from Yukon, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut. There is provision also for four or eight extra senators to break a deadlock between the Senate and the House: either one or two each from the Maritime region, Québec, Ontario and the West; but this has been used only once, in 1990.

The senators are appointed by the Governor General on the recommendation of the prime minister. Senators must be at least 30 years old, and must have real estate worth \$4000 net, and total net assets of at least \$4000 above all debts and liabilities: (which, in 1916, would've only been equivalent to \$76,700 in 2016).

More-so, they must reside in the province or territory for which they are appointed; in Québec, they must reside, or have their property qualification - in the particular one of Québec's 24 senatorial districts for which they are appointed.

Till 1965, they held office for life; now, they hold office until age 75. The Constitution Act, 1867 sets out certain grounds whereby senators can be disqualified from office, including missing two consecutive sessions of Parliament

The **Senate** can initiate any bills except bills providing for the *expenditure of public money* or *imposing taxes*. Otherwise, it can amend or reject any bill whatsoever. It can reject any bill as often as it sees fit. No bill can become law unless it has been passed by the Senate.

In theory these powers are formidable, but, as an appointed body, the Senate exercises its power with restraint. For over 40 years the Senate did not reject a bill passed by the House of Commons, and very rarely insisted on an amendment that the House rejected. Then, in 1988, it refused to pass the Free Trade Agreement bill until it had been submitted to the people in a general election. Since that time, there have been several other instances in which the Senate has rejected or simply not adopted bills before the end of a session, thereby effectively stopping them from becoming law.

Most of the *amendments* the Senate makes to bills passed by the Commons are *clarifying* or *simplifying* amendments, and are *almost* always accepted by the House of Commons. The Senate's main work is done in its *committees*, where it goes over bills *clause* by *clause* and hears *evidence*, often voluminous, from groups and individuals who would be affected by the particular bill under review. This committee work is *especially* effective because the Senate has many members with *specialized knowledge* and *long years of legal, business or administrative experience*. Their ranks may include exministers, ex-premiers of provinces, mayors, eminent lawyers and *even* experienced farmers.

The Senate also conducts investigations into important public concerns, such as mental health, aging, national security and defence, indigenous affairs, fisheries, and human rights. These investigations have produced valuable reports, which have often led to changes in legislation or government policies. The Senate usually does this kind of work far more cheaply than Royal Commissions or task forces, because its members are paid already and it has a permanent staff at its disposal.

The House of Commons

The **House of Commons** is the major law-making body. In each of the country's **338 constituencies**, or *ridings*, the candidate who gets the largest number of votes is elected to the House of Commons, even if his or her vote is less than half the total. The number of constituencies may be changed after every *10-year census*, pursuant to the **Constitution** and the **Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act**, which allot parliamentary seats *roughly* on the *basis of population*. Every province must have at least as many members in the Commons as it had in the Senate before 1982. The constituencies vary somewhat in size, within prescribed limits.

Area	Seats
Ontario	121
Quebec	78
British Columbia	42
Alberta	34
Manitoba	14
Saskatchewan	14
Nova Scotia	11
New Brunswick	10
Newfoundland and Labras	dor7
Prince Edward Island	4
Northwest Territories	1
Nunavut	1
Yukon	1
Total	338

Political Parties

Our system could not work without *political parties*. Our major and minor federal parties were *not created by any law*, *though* they are *now recognized by "the law"*. We, the people, have created them ourselves. They are voluntary associations of people who hold broadly similar opinions on public questions.

The party that wins the largest number of seats in a *general election* ordinarily forms the government. Its leader is asked by the **Governor General** to become *prime minister*. If it has the most seats but not a clear majority, it may still be able to form a *minority government* with support from other parties; this has happened more than a dozen times since Confederation. If the government in office before an election comes out of the election with only the second largest number of seats, it still has the right to meet the new House of Commons and see whether it can get enough support from the minor parties to give it a majority of votes in the House and continue governing. This happened in 1925–26 with **Mackenzie King**, and in 1972 with **Pierre Trudeau**.

The second largest party (or, in the rare circumstances just described, the largest) becomes the official **Opposition** and its leader becomes the person holding the recognized position of **leader of the Opposition**. The leader of the Opposition gets the same salary as a minister. The leader of any party that has at least 12 seats also gets a higher salary than an ordinary member of the House of Commons.

Each of these *recognized parties* - including both the government and the official Opposition - gets **public money** for research.

Why? Because we want criticism, we want watchfulness, we want the possibility of an effective alternative government if we are displeased with the one we have. The party system reflects the waves of opinion as they rise and wash through the country. There is much froth, but deep swells move beneath them, and they set the course of the ship.

The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister's official residence is **24 Sussex Drive**, a home originally named **Gorffwysfa** (Welsh for "a place of peace").

As we have already noted, the prime ministership (premiership), like the parties, is not created by law, though it is recognized by the law. The prime minister is normally a member of the House of Commons (there have been two from the Senate, from 1891 to 1892 and from 1894 to 1896). A non-member can hold the office but, by custom, must seek election to a seat very soon. A prime minister may lose his or her seat in an election, but can remain in office as long as the party has sufficient support in the House of Commons to be able to govern, though again, he or she must, by custom, win a seat very promptly. The traditional way of arranging this is to have a member of the party resign, thereby creating a vacancy, which gives the defeated prime minister the opportunity to run in a by-election. (This arrangement is also generally followed when the leader of the Opposition or other party leader does not have a seat.)

The prime minister is appointed by the **Governor General**. Ordinarily, the appointment is straightforward. If the **Opposition** wins more than half the seats in an election, or if the government is defeated in the **House of Commons** and resigns, the Governor General must call on the leader of the Opposition to form a new government.

The **prime minister** used to be described as the "first among equals" in the cabinet, or as "a moon among minor stars." This is no longer so. He-or-she is now incomparably more powerful than any colleague. prime minister chooses the ministers in the first place, and can also ask any of them to resign; if the minister refuses, the prime minister can advise the Governor General to remove that minister and the advice would invariably be followed. Cabinet decisions do not necessarily go by majority vote. A strong prime minister, having listened to everyone's opinion, may simply announce that his-or-her view as the policy of the government - even if most, or all, the other ministers are opposed. Unless the dissenting ministers are prepared to resign, they must bow to the decision.

The Cabinet

As mentioned, the prime minister chooses the members of the cabinet. All of them must be or become members of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada. Privy Councilors are appointed by the Governor General on the advice of the prime minister, and membership is for life, unless a member is dismissed by the Governor General on the same advice. All cabinet ministers and former cabinet ministers are always members, as are the Chief Justice of Canada and former chief justices and, usually, ex-Speakers of the Senate and of the House of Commons. Various other prominent citizens can be made members simply as a mark of honour.

The whole Privy Council as such never meets. Only the ministers and a handful of non-ministers attend the rare ceremonial occasions when the Privy Council is called together, such as proclaiming the accession of a new Monarch and/or consenting to a royal marriage. The cabinet, "the Committee of the Privy Council," is the Council's operative body.

By custom, almost all the members of the cabinet must be members of the House of Commons, or, if not already members, must win seats. Since Confederation, on occasion, people who were not members of either house have been appointed to the cabinet (as happened in 1996 and 2006), but they had to get seats in the House or the Senate within a reasonable time, or resign from the cabinet. General Andrew McNaughton was Minister of National Defence for nine months in 1944–45 without a seat in either house, but after he had twice failed to get elected to the Commons, he had to resign.

Senators can be members of the cabinet; the first cabinet, of 13 members, had five senators. Twice between 1979 and 1984, there were three or four senators in the cabinet. The **Conservatives**, in 1979, elected very few MPs from Québec, and the **Liberals**, in 1980, elected only two from the four Western provinces. So both parties had

to eke out the necessary cabinet representation for the respective provinces by appointing more Senators to the Cabinet. Until recently, most senators appointed leader of the government in the Senate were cabinet ministers. No senator can sit in the House of Commons, and no member of the House of Commons can sit in the Senate. But a minister from the House of Commons may, by invitation of the Senate, come to that chamber and speak (though not vote).

By custom, every province must, as possible, have at least one cabinet minister. Of course, if a province does not elect any government supporters, this becomes difficult. In that case, the prime minister may put a senator from that province into the cabinet, or get some member from another province to resign his or her seat and then try to get a person from the "missing" province elected there. In 1921, the Liberals did not elect a single member from Alberta. Prime Minister Mackenzie King solved the problem of Alberta representation in the cabinet by getting the Hon. Charles Stewart, Liberal ex-premier of Alberta, nominated in the Québec constituency of Argenteuil and then elected. Whether Mr. King's ploy would work now is quite another question. The voters of today do not always look with favour upon outside candidates being "parachuted" into their ridings. The smallest province, Prince Edward Island, has often gone unrepresented in the cabinet for years at a stretch.

By custom *also*, Ontario and Québec usually have 10 or 12 ministers each, provided each province has elected enough government supporters to warrant such a number. Historically, at least one minister from Québec was an English-speaking Protestant, and there was at least one minister from the French-speaking minorities outside Québec, normally from New Brunswick or Ontario, or both. It also used to be necessary to have at least one English.

The Foreign-Interest Lobby

Furthermore, referring to the "Jewish Lobby" and the "Zionist-dominated media" in Canada, Canada's foreign policy is dominated by domestic interests. Canada's Jewish community is better organized and takes politics more seriously than other ethnic groups (Riddell-Dixon 1985:46; Taras and Weinfeld 1990:670). The primary organizations in its lobby are the Canadian Jewish Congress, the Canadian Zionist Federation and the fraternal organization B'nai Brith Canada. In 1967, as a response to the perceived unpreparedness of Canada's Jewish community to lobby for Israel, these groups created the Canada-Israel Committee (CIC), which remains the foremost pro-Israel lobby in Canada until today.

However, various Jewish lobbies have presented themselves over the years. The United Zionist Council was founded in 1941, transformed into the Zionist Organization of Canada, and *eventually* reconstituted as the Canadian Zionist Federation in 1967 (*Taras 1989:44-50*). Canada's Jewish lobbies have taken a clandestine strategy of *behind the scenes lobbying*...

The CIC, was established in 1994 following a reorganization within the federal government, and was renamed to its current name with the swearing in of the 29th Canadian Ministry in 2015: The combined Cabinet, chaired by "Castro's little potato" PM Trudeau, and those Ministers which began governing Canada shortly before the opening of the 42nd Parliament.

The CIC is a powerful and feared Zionist lobby. The IRCC is more-so a well-organized and well-funded lobby. It has been able to court influential individuals into defending the Jewish state (Taras 1984:18). Yet, as has been demonstrated, Canadian foreign policy has been largely self-serving and not always responsive to the "Jewish Lobby."

However, the success of lobby groups representing a constituency of approximately 1.4% of the entire Canadian population (Taras and Weinfeld 1990:666) does attest to the lobbies' strength. More difficult to dismiss is the 1987 poll of Department of External Affairs (DEA) bureaucrats who rank the "Jewish Lobby" as having the highest influence in the formation of Canada's Middle-East policy. This could be attributed to a general feeling in the DEA that Canada's foreign policy should be more sympathetic to Arab causes. In other words, since the